



National  
Foreign  
Assessment  
Center

## Near East and South Asia Review

23 November 1979

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[REDACTED]

NEAR EAST AND SOUTE ASIA REVIEW [REDACTED]

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CONTENTS

Afghanistan: Outlook for the Insurgency During Winter 1  
[REDACTED] . . . . .

The course of the insurgency will be shaped primarily by factors that have been central to the conflict since it began in 1978-- Soviet support, loyalty of the military, and rebel disunity. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Afghanistan: Outlook for the Insurgency During Winter

The effect of winter--which arrived this month in northern and eastern Afghanistan--on the scale and tempo of the insurgency will depend on the severity of the weather. Last winter insurgent tribesmen took advantage of unusually mild weather to expand their areas of operation in the eastern provinces, currently the scene of the heaviest fighting. [REDACTED]

The course of the insurgency during the winter months ending in April will be shaped primarily by factors that have been central to the conflict since it began in the spring of 1978--Soviet support, loyalty of the military, and disunity of rebel forces. Neither the government nor the rebels appear capable of gaining a decisive edge in the months ahead. Both sides may concentrate on strengthening their respective positions. [REDACTED]

The chances this winter are good for further mutinies in the Army, and this could bring about the collapse of President Amin's regime. Unless the Army turns against the regime and reaches an understanding with the tribes, however, the rebellion probably will drag on inconclusively into the spring. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

23 November 1979

1



[REDACTED]


Pages: 2 + 3

Exemptions: (b)(1) + (b)(3)



Key Factors

Other factors will transcend weather in determining the course of the insurgency during the coming months. The rebel effort will continue to be impeded by the failure of the various independent insurgent groups to coordinate operations. Additionally, unless the rebels receive more meaningful military support  than it has thus far--particularly antitank and antiaircraft weapons--and more financial backing from Saudi Arabia, their effort to bring the Soviet-equipped Army to the point of collapse may lose momentum. 



23 November 1979